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CEO pay-performance and board independence: the impact 




This paper examines the impact of board characteristics and CEO compensation on firm 
performance when firm performance is adjusted for the effect of earnings management.  Results 
from regression analysis indicates that the CEO pay-performance relation is substantially lower 
when firm performance is adjusted for the effect of earnings management than when firm 
performance is measured as reported performance. That is, the positive effect of executive 
compensation on firm performance disappears when firm performance is measured as adjusted 
firm performance excluding earnings management in Chinese listed firms, and as a result, we can 
identify that the evident executive pay-performance relation is largely cosmetic. We also find that 
the proportion of independent directors on board is significantly positively associated with firm 
performance only when the firm performance is adjusted for the effect of earnings management. 
Similar results are found in ownership concentration too. These results suggest that independent 
directors are shown as more effective governance mechanism in Chinese listed firms when true 
firm performance is considered while the positive effect of CEO compensation disappears 
concerning true firm performance. 
 















individual firms, become an open question and accordingly need more empirical evidence. 
te governance code 2002 which 
requires certain percentage of independent directors on board. 
                                                           
1. Introduction 
Corporate governance has been concerned in Asia after the 1997 Asia economic crisis. Corporate 
scandals globally, for example, WorldCom, Enron, Adelphia, and Tyco, have also highlighted 
deficiencies in corporate governance systems, more specifically, the role of board of directors. 
Therefore, the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC)  released a new corporate 
governance code in 2002 suggesting many additional requirements and recommendations for 
listed Chinese firms, say, for example, Chinese boards are required to have independent 
directors . 
In the mean time, China has become the second-largest economy in the world following US in 
2006 based on purchasing power parity (PPP) (CIA, 2007). In terms of the report from the 
Economist (2008), China’s gross domestic product (GDP) increased 11.4% on average at yearly 
bases to 24.66 trillion yuans (or approximately 3.43 trillion US dollars) in 2007.  Thus, how the 
governance mechanisms improve China’s economy, or more specifically, the performan
The specific characteristics of corporate governance which differentiate China from its Western 
counterparts are highly concentrated ownership, mainly control of State, insufficient long-term 
incentives for CEOs, and less independent boards. Additionally, institutional investors are 
believed to play an important role in western countries (Chung et al., 2002) while they basically 
hold a small amount of shares in Chinese listed firms and thus cannot play any important role in 
monitoring management like their western counterparts. Therefore, whilst institutional ownership 
was fully investigated to see if institutional investors improve firm performance, we focus on 
board characteristics, with particular interest of the corpora
Extant literature suggests that corporate governance structures such as board independence and 
executive compensation can significantly impact both corporate performance and earnings 
management.  Lai (2005) investigates the relation between Chinese board independence and 
earnings management and finds that firms voluntarily adopt board independence decline to 
manage their earnings while others do not experience similar results. Cornett et al. (2008) argue if 
 
2 In August 2001, the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) released statement 102 “Guidelines 
for establishing an independent directors system for listed companies” in which one third independent 
directors are required for listed firms by June, 2003. 
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ngs management), our studies fill the 
void and offer empirical evidence from emerging economy. 
suggest that the CEO compensation may be not as effective as we used to think to enhance firm 
both earnings management and corporate performance are likewise impacted by governance 
mechanisms then the influence of these governance mechanisms on reported firm performance is 
probably partly cosmetic. In China, most of the firms only keep two thirds of independent 
directors on board according to the minimum board independence requirements of CSRC (China 
Securities Regulatory Commission). Therefore, whether the independent directors are still 
effective when the minimum proportion of independent directors on board is mandated by CSRC 
remains unanswered.  Additionally, whether the independent directors are still effective when the 
firm performance was deprived of the effects of earnings management also makes China a good 
example to be investigated. In response to the specific governance structures in China, we extend 
the prior studies on CEO pay-performance, board characteristics and earnings management to 
China’s sample. Specifically, there is no evidence ever provided on Chinese firms regarding 
adjusted firm performance (reported firm performance-earni
This study empirically examines the relation between board composition, CEO compensation and 
reported firm performance after taking account of the effect of earnings management. We found 
that the coefficient on CEO compensation, which is .0104 when firm performance is measured as 
pre-managed performance (reported firm performance), decreased to .0032 when the firm 
performance is adjusted performance (reported firm performance-earnings management). The 
estimates of coefficient on CEO compensation are significantly positive for the reported firm 
performance, but no significant influence is found for the adjusted firm performance. Therefore, 
the positive effect of executive compensation on firm performance disappears when firm 
performance is measured as adjusted firm performance, and as a result, we can identify that the 
evident executive pay-performance relation is largely cosmetic. On the other hand, prior literature 
has emphasized the key role played by the board in arranging executive compensation and 
enhancing firm performance. For example, Bebchuk and Fried (2003, 2004) suggest that lack of 
board oversight can contribute to CEO overcompensation. However, prior empirical evidence on 
board independence provides mixed results. In our analysis, the coefficient on the proportion of 
independent directors on board almost doubles from 0.0153 for reported firm performance to 
0.0294 when adjusted firm performance is considered, and the coefficient also changes from 
insignificant when reported firm performance is employed to positively significant at better than 
5% level when adjusted firm performance is computed.  Thus, independent directors are shown as 
more effective governance mechanism when true firm performance is considered. Our results 
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value while Chinese boards in fact significantly improve firm performance when real 
performance is considered. 
The paper proceeds in five sections. The next section reviews the literature on corporate 
governance such as the monitoring role of boards of directors and earnings management. Section 
3 introduces the data used in our study, presents the methods to identify earnings management, 
and discusses the empirical approach. Section 4 presents empirical results and further robustness 
tests. A final section concludes and discusses directions for future research. 
2. Corporate governance and earnings management 
2.1 Earnings management 
It’s recognized for years in accounting and finance literature that managers use the latitude in 
accounting rules to manage accounting numbers to serve their own or the firm’s interests in a 
wide variety of contexts (see, for example, Chen and Yuan, 2004). In Healy and Wahlen (1999)’s 
review article, they conclude that the evidence is consistent with earnings management “to alter 
financial reports to either mislead some stakeholders about the underlying economic performance 
of the company or to influence contractual outcomes that depend on reported accounting 
numbers. ” The review on earnings management by Healy and Wahlen (1999) also points out that 
if financial reports are used to convey managers’ information on their firms’ performance, 
managers must be allowed to exercise judgment in financial reporting. However, management’s 
discretion on judgment also leads to earnings management, under certain circumstances, even 
fraud.  
With regard to the different incentives for managers to manage earnings, academic research 
normally supports that the “bonus hypothesis” (managerial compensation) and the “debt 
hypothesis” (debt contracts) are the main motivations for earnings management among various 
contracting theories (see, Watts and Zimmerman, 1990). The use of accruals, more specifically 
the discretionary accruals, to increase or decrease reported income temporarily is one normal way 
to manage earnings. Total accruals are components of earnings that are not reflected in current 
cash flows, and considerable managerial discretion determines their accruals.  
In prior literature, Klein (2002), Dechow et al. (1996) and Beasley (1996) all find that earnings 




Bedard et al. (2004) found that the proportion of independent directors on audit committee 
decreases the magnitude of discretionary accruals. 
2.2 Corporate governance mechanisms 
Extant literature on both how corporate governance affects corporate performance and how 
corporate governance influences earnings management is numerous in Western economies. For 
example, Dechow et al. (1996) and Beasley (1996) examine the impact of board on financial 
fraud while they do not focus on the use of discretionary accruals. In the meantime, corporate 
governance in emerging markets as China has not been studied as intensively as in developed 
markets, take Lai (2005) for example, earnings management decreased when Chinese boards 
voluntarily adopted larger proportion of independent directors.   
2.2.1 Executive compensation 
Aiming at aligning CEO’s interests with shareholder and maximizing shareholder wealth, the 
CEO compensation should be tied to firm performance (Fung et al., 2001), or in other words, the 
pay-performance sensitivity 3  should be high. Baker (1992), Dechow and Sloan (1991) and 
Kaplan (1994) all suggest that the CEO pay-performance relation is the essence of principal-agent 
theory. In order to confirm the relation, empirical studies have been done in different contexts. 
For example, Kato et al. (2007) document a significant positive relation between executive cash 
compensation and stock market performance in Korean listed firms. Evidence also is provided 
from China, most prior literature shows a significant positive relation between CEO 
compensation and firm performance (e.g., Kato and Long, 2006). 
According to Healy and Wahlen (1999), accounting data (for example, the accounting 
performance) are used to assist monitor the contracts between the shareholders and managers. 
Explicit and implicit executive compensation contracts are employed to align the interests of 
shareholders and management, resulting in the use of accounting judgment by managers to 
increase earnings-based bonus awards. Particularly, the CEOs of Chinese firms do not have long-
term incentives such as stock options until recently, thus, executive managers in China are more 
likely to employ earnings management to increase their cash compensation such as bonus. 
 
3 Pay-performance sensitivity is defined as the dollar change in the CEO’s compensation associated with a 
dollar change in the wealth of shareholders. 
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Prior studies in accounting literature have concentrated on earnings management by managers 
aiming to meet explicit bonus-linked targets for reported earnings or increase their bonuses. For 
example, Degeorge et al. (1999) find that accruals management is higher when the pre-managed 
earnings are below zero if executive compensation is linked to earnings. Likewise, Gaver et al. 
(1995) and Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) report evidence of earnings management consistent 
with income smoothing, which makes sense for managers whose bonus-linked incentives are 
focused on exceeding explicit earnings thresholds. Darrough et al. (1998) provide evidence from 
Japan and find that managers use income-increasing accruals to increase their bonus, which is 
similar to their U.S. counterparts. Several prior studies have also examined earnings management 
as well as CEO compensation in Chinese firms. For example, Aharony et al. (2000) find the 
existence of earnings management pre-IPO (initial public offerings) in Chinese listed firms. 
Moreover, Kato and Long (2006) document a significant relation between CEO cash 
compensation and firm performance, however they do not provide further evidence that if the 
strong CEO pay-performance relation still exists after adjusting firm performance for earnings 
management. 
Overall, existing research suggests that the level of discretionary accruals (as a proxy for earnings 
management) is associated with the level of management incentives. More specifically, 
discretionary accruals increase in response to the stock option compensation of CEOs. However, 
prior findings of the relation between executive compensation and reported earnings are 
inconclusive and incomplete, especially in China.  In response to the findings of Cornett et al. 
(2008), we will also expect a positive association between earnings management and executive 
compensation and hence less impact of executive compensation on firm performance after 
adjusting for the effects of earnings management in Chinese listed firms, compared with prior 
research in China. 
2.2.2 Ownership structure 
China has a complex political economy representing a hybrid of private ownership and state 
control.  If the state owns controlling shareholdings of the firm, it is not surprising that politicians 
and directors controlled by the state sit on most board, leading to different governance structures. 
In China, the majority of publicly listed firms are state-owned firms (Claessens and Fan, 2002). In 
2005, the State still owned as much as two-thirds of all shares on Shanghai and Shenzhen 




concentrated shareholdings have numerous economic incentives to mitigate agency costs4 and 
hence to monitor managers. This can reduce the free-rider problem usually accompanied with 
small dispersed shareholders. As a result, the concentrated large shareholders are likely to 
monitor management effectively and thus constrain the ability of managers to manage earnings. 
However, highly concentrated State ownership is largely different from highly concentrated 
private ownership. That is, the benefits of having a concentrated controlling shareholder to better 
monitor managers may not exist when the controlling owner is the state. In terms of the 
concentrated State ownership in China, several studies provide empirical evidence on the impact 
of state ownership upon some variables such as corporate performance.  Prior research shows that 
corporate accounting performance is inversely related to the level of direct state ownership (e.g., 
Qi et al., 2000; Hovey et al., 2003), while the sample period of their dataset is mostly pre 2003. 
To sum up, prior studies on ownership structure emphasize the important role ownership structure 
plays in determining firm performance and earnings management. This idea leads to our 
expectations that ownership structure, e.g., state ownership, and ownership concentration, 
significantly impacts corporate performance, even when the performance is adjusted for the 
effects of earnings management. 
2.2.3 Board characteristics 
2.2.3.1 Board independence 
Boards of directors are generally believed to play an important role in corporate governance, 
specifically in monitoring managers (Fama and Jensen, 1983), reviewing and approving strategic 
decisions (Adams and Ferreira, 2007). First of all, Beasley (1996) and Dechow et al (1996) claim 
that independent directors are more likely to oversee and disclose due to their desire to maintain 
their reputations. Therefore, the board of directors, more specifically the outside directors on the 
board, is believed to monitor top management and hence to constrain earnings management. 
Secondly, Oxelheim and Randoy (2003) argue that outside directors on board can enhance good 
reputation of the firm they serve in the financial market, resulting in higher financial performance.  
Basically the serious issues of China’s corporate governance since last decade are the weak 
independent directors and subcommittees in listed firms (see, Tam, 2002; Tenev and Zhang, 
 
4 When the shareholders and the board make poor decisions due to managed biased accounting numbers, 
earnings management is classified as agency cost (Davidson et al., 2004). 
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2002). In order to resolve those issues, the new corporate governance code released in 2002 
requires each listed firm to have at least one third of independent directors on the board by June 
2003.  
There is huge literature on the role of the boards as well as outside directors on the board. 
Outsider-dominated boards are arguably better in monitor and control management (Dechow et 
al., 1996; Weisbach, 1988). Hence, extant papers provide evidence suggesting that board 
independence is associated with effective governance and good firm performance (Brickley et al., 
1994; Weisbach, 1988) when others document a negative relation between outside directors and 
the incidence of earnings management (Dechow et al., 1996; Beasley, 1996). For example, Klein 
(2002) shows that not only board independence is inversely related to discretionary accruals but 
also reductions in board independence are accompanied by large increase in discretionary 
accruals. Peasnell et al. (2000) likewise find that the proportion of outsiders on the board is 
negatively associated with the level of income-increasing discretionary accruals to avoid 
reporting loss or earnings reductions. On the other hand, boards composed of more executive 
directors may be more willing to conceal poor corporate performance from stakeholders to gain 
private benefits (Anderson et al., 2004). Moreover, Lefort and Urzua (2008) study the relation 
between board characteristics and corporate performance in Chilean firms and find an increase in 
the proportion of outside directors enhances firm value. Evidence is also provided from China 
that the improvement of boards’ monitoring role can reduce the occurrence of earnings 
management. For example, Lai (2005) suggests that Chinese firms which choose to voluntarily 
increase their board independence to a larger proportion than required are less likely to manage 
their earnings. 
Therefore, if the independent directors perform effectively in China’s listed firms, then we can 
expect that earnings management decreases in response to more board independence.  Moreover, 
we investigate the relation between the proportion of independent directors on board and adjusted 
firm performance (pre-managed performance) and expect a stronger relation between board 
independence and true firm performance.  
2.2.3.2 Audit committees 
The CSRC released a new corporate governance code in 2002 suggesting many additional 
requirements and recommendations for listed Chinese firms due to recent surge of corporate 




committees, while commonplace, are not mandatory and did not exist before 2000, are also 
increasing significantly in China’s listed firms. The CSRC recommends to have all or mostly 
independent directors on audit committee and to have at least one financial expert on audit 
committee. The audit committee mainly oversees the firm’s financial reporting process. It meets 
regularly with outside auditors and financial managers to review the financial statements, audit 
process and internal controls. 
Audit committees have turned into an important means for firms to monitor the reliability of the 
financial reporting process. However, the findings of extant literature on the relation between 
audit committee and fraudulent financial reporting have been mixed. For example, Peasnell et al. 
(2000) are unable to find evidence that the presence of an audit committee impacts the magnitude 
of earnings management (either income-increasing or income-decreasing). However, McMullen 
(1996) reports that the presence of audit committee is associated with a decreased occurrence of 
errors, irregularities and unreliable financial reporting. Klein (2002) supports the findings of 
McMullen (1996) by the evidence that discretional accruals are reduced with a larger proportion 
of independent directors on the audit committee.  Overall, previous studies suggest that the role of 
the audit committee is to reduce the level of positive or negative discretionary accruals (Klein, 
2002). Therefore we also predict that the positive relation between the presence of audit 
committee and firm performance will be stronger when the reported firm performance is adjusted 
for the effects of earnings management. 
3. Data and methodology 
3.1 Sample  
Prior research finds that earnings management is more prevalent in poorly performing firms (e.g., 
Kothari et al., 2005) and when applied to firms with extreme corporate performance the standard 
models of discretionary accruals may not be reliable (Dechow et al., 1995). Here, following 
Cornett et al. (2008), we look at factors affecting earnings management in “normal” times when 
even good performing firms are influenced. That is, firms which received special treatment (ST) 
and particular transfer (PT)5 during the sample window are deleted. Thus, here the potential 
 
5 CSRC released the Special Treatment (ST) regulation in 1998 that firms are specially treated if they make 
losses for two successive years. Additionally, one more year of loss makes the ST firms “Particular 
Transfer” (PT) firms. PT regulation was effective over the period 1999 to 2001. After 4th Dec 2001, firms 
with consecutive three year losses will be suspended and if it persists until the first midterm reports those 




limitations of empirical discretionary accruals models can be ignored in this study because the 
sample of firms is free of financial distress. 
Specifically, we constructed the dataset by merging the following three separate databases. First, 
we used accounting and other corporate governance data from the database developed by SinoFin 
Information Services6. Second, we assembled basic data on stock returns from CCFR database 
developed by Tsinghua University. Thirdly, we employed CEO compensation data from China 
Stock Market and Accounting Research Database (CSMAR) developed by Shenzhen GTA 
Information Technology Company. 
We then exclude all financial firms (Standard Industrial Classification of CSRC China Securities 
Regulatory Commission codes I01-I99) because they are subject to fundamentally different 
regulatory regimes and internal governance structures. The final sample consists of data on 21 
non-financial industries in terms of standard industrial classification codes of CSRC during the 
time periods from 2000 to 2007. 
We then delete observations without the availability of executive compensation, accounting and 
financial data, and corporate governance data that this study needs. After these adjustments, we 
are left with a sample of 7327 firm-years over sample period 2000-2007. Like the study of 
Cornett et al. (2008), the variables of the economic determinants of firm performance and 
earnings management were lagged one year to reduce potential endogeneity. Table 1 defines all 
the variables in our regression analysis. 
3.2 Discretionary accruals 
Dechow et al. (1995) claim the so-called “modified Jones (1991) model” as the model that 
provides the most power for detecting earnings management after they compare several models of 
discretionary accruals. Furthermore, Bartov et al. (2001) advocate the use of the modified Jones 
model when it is estimated cross-sectional using other firms in the same industry. Most models of 
discretionary accruals refer to discretionary accruals as the difference between actual and 
“normal” accruals, estimated by a regression formula. Firstly, the modified Jones model estimates 
normal accruals as a fraction of lagged assets from the following equation: 
 
6 Prior research has used SinoFin data set in their studies on China’s corporate governance, for example, 
















TA ββα     (1) 
Where is total accruals for firm j in year t. Total accruals are calculated as earnings before 
interests and tax (EBIT)
jtTA
7. is total assets for firm j in year t, jtAssets jtSalesΔ is change in sales 
for firm j in year t, and is property, plant, equipment for firm j in year t. jtPPE
In response to the research of Hribar and Collins (2002), compared with balance sheet, cash flow 
statement is preferred in computing total accruals when there are events such as mergers and 
acquisitions which change balance sheet but not income statement. Following Cornett et al. 
(2008), we also compute total accruals as operating income (proxy for earnings before 
extraordinary items and discontinued operations) minus operating cash flows from continuing 




















TADA ββα      (2) 
Where hats refer to as estimated values from regression Eq.1. Modified Jones model adds 
, which attempts to identify the amounts of aggressive recognition of 
questionable sales in sales changes, to the original Jones model. Following prior research on 
earnings management (e.g., Bergstresser and Philippon, 2006), the value of discretionary accruals 
is normally used as a proxy for the magnitude of earnings management. Like the study of Bartov 
et al. (2001), we run cross-sectional regressions for each year in the sample period when the 
results of pooled time-series cross-sectional regressions will be discussed in detail in later section. 
jtceivablesReΔ
In Table 2, we present summary statistics concerning earnings management, CEO compensation, 
board and firm-specific measures. A spearman correlation table among independent variables is 
given in Panel B of Table 2. Correlations between each indicidual variables are less than 0.5, thus 
the statistics suggest that multicollinearity is not a major problem in our models. 
                                                            
7 EBIT is not required to be reported in income statement of China’s listed firms. Therefore, we employ 






Panel C of Table 2 presents descriptive statistics of firm performance over 2000-2007. The 
average signed value and absolute value of discretionary accruals are both showed because 
discretionary accruals must be reversed at some point. The signed value is only 0.027% on 
average, even smaller than the signed discretionary accruals in the US while the average absolute 
value is about 7%, much higher than their US counterparts (0.61%8).  Although the absolute 
value is significantly greater than the signed value, we still focus on signed value in examining 
the effects of other corporate governance, like Carter et al. (2005). The reason behind is that 
executive compensation is found to have different effects on discretionary accruals when they are 
positive or negative (Carter et al., 2005). 
3.3 Firm performance and executive compensation 
Closest to our paper is the work by Cornett et al. (2008), therefore we also measure the reported 
firm performance as ROA, operating income/assets, mostly used in prior research as 
measurement of firm performance. However, as a result of managers’ influence over accruals (for 
example, accounts receivable) as well as the treatment of amortization, ROA is likely to be 
manipulated by CEO (Dechow et al., 1996). In order to measure true firm performance without 
management manipulation, we use the difference between operating income/assets and %DA as 
proxy for adjusted performance. Therefore, exclusion of discretionary components makes this 
firm performance a more true performance compared with reported ROA, which might be 
cosmetic due to management discretion in accounting treatment. 
We focus on cash compensation because we are interested in the reward portion of total 
compensation. Hence, the cash compensation can be viewed as ex-post compensation depending 
on past and current performance (see, for example, Gaver and Gaver, 1998; Comprix and Mueller, 
2006). Following Leone et al. (2006), we use the sum of bonus and salary, which is the total cash 
compensation, as the measurement of executive compensation. Moreover, we employ the nature 
log of cash compensation like most prior studies (see, e.g., Lambert and Larcker, 1987). The 
nature log can mitigate the difference in executive compensation across firms and hence reduce 
heteroskedasticity. Among the alternative measures of executive compensation provided in the 
SinoFin database, average pay of all CEOs and directors, which composes of the salary and bonus, 
is more likely to identify the whole profile of executive compensation in China’s listed firms and 
thus will be the focus of our study. 
 




Descriptive statistics for CEO compensation are summarized in Panel A of Table 2 where all 
compensations are in 2000-constant yuans. Over the sample period of 2000-2007 average cash 
compensation of executive managers was on average about 119,743 yuans (or approximately 
14,968 US dollars) of 2000-constant yuans, which is much lower than that of their counterparts in 
the U.S. and Japan9. The mean CEO compensations are 33,200 yuans, 45,631 yuans, 59,317 
yuans, 74,349 yuans, 87,144 yuans, 85,652 yuans, 246,845 yuans and 325,801 yuans in 2000, 
2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, and 2007, respectively. That is, the average CEO 
compensation almost increased by 10 times in 8 years. The pay ranges from 1,600 to 329,100 
yuans, 3,046 to 290,286 yuans, 3,648 to 425,466 yuans, 5,570 to 1,211,048 yuans, 5,479 to 
1,516,119 yuans, 0 to 1,655,976 yuans, 6,000 to 3,016,200 yuans, and 0 to 4,700,000 yuans in 
2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006 and 2007, respectively. 
Two measurements of firm performance were reported in Table 2, Panel C: operating 
income/assets and (operating income/assets)-%DA. The average operating income/assets based 
on reported earnings is 2.65%, and the mean performance measurement based on adjusted 
earnings (i.e., the effect of discretionary accruals on reported performance is removed) is 2.61%, 
very similar to performance adjusted for earnings management.  
Then we investigate whether industry adjustment makes any difference in firm performance. For 
each firm, we identify industry comparison firms as all firms listed on CCER with the same three-
digit SIC code of CSRC China. Industry-adjusted performance is the firm’s operating income in 
any year minus the average industry value for that year. We measure firm performance 
alternatively as reported ROA, operating income/Assets, or performance adjusted for 
discretionary accruals, operating income/Assets-%DA. Industry adjusted performance is zero 
either by using operating income/assets or by using operating income/assets-%DA 
3.4 Ownership structure and board characteristics 
To examine our hypotheses in terms of board characteristics, we collect data on the board 
characteristics. In particular, we determine the proportion of independent directors, board size, 
and the existence of audit committee. 
 
9 For example, Core et al. (1999) report an average of cash compensation of USD 614,000 for a sample of 
205 firms between 1982 and 1984. 
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Because free-riding problems among directors increase with board size (Jensen, 1993), smaller 
boards are expected to be more effective monitors than large boards. However, large boards are 
likely to be more effective monitors than small boards because they are harder controlled by 
management and thus can more effectively protect shareholders’ interests (Zahra and Pearce, 
1989). Moreover, larger boards of firms with several committees allow for fewer committee 
assignments for each director,  devoting more time and effort to monitor management (Monks 
and MInow, 1995), and provide better monitoring of the financial reporting process (Anderson et 
al., 2004). 
Most prior U.S. studies use two proxies for board independence, the proportion of outside 
directors, and a dummy variable showing whether the board has a majority of outside directors 
(He et al., 2008; Klein, 2002; Bedard et al, 2004; Abbott et al., 2004). However, the percentage of 
independent directors on the board of China’s listed firms is seldom greater than 50%, which is 
quite different from their U.S. counterparts, therefore we only use the proportion of independent 
directors as proxy for board independence. 
Standard setters and scholars focus more on the role of audit committee after corporate scandals 
such as Enron, and practitioners suggest that audit committees play an important role in 
overseeing the financial reporting process. However, inconclusive results were provided for the 
effectiveness of audit committee. For example, neither Peasnell et al (2005) nor Beasley (1996) 
find any evidence that the presence of audit committee reduces the magnitude of earnings 
management. To test whether audit committee reduces earnings management, we include a 
dummy variable (AC) in our models. 
In order to investigate China’s data, two common features of China’s listed firms should be 
concerned, the highly concentrated ownership and predominance of state ownership (Kato and 
Long, 2006).  Accordingly, we employ two dummy variables to represent the ultimate owners, 
that is, State-owned, and Family-owned. In addition, one of the specific characteristics of Chinese 
firms is having a stockholder whose stockholdings far exceed the second largest stockholder (Xu, 
2004). The propensity to manage earnings (including financial fraud) may be higher or lower for 
the largest stockholder according to the percent of shares they owned. Additionally, other large 
stockholders are likely to affect the likelihood of earnings management. To control the effects of 
ownership structure, we use an ownership concentration variable (CR_5), the sum of the first to 
fifth largest shareholders’ shareholding percent in our regressions.  
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Panel D of Table 2 presents summary statistics on board characteristics and ownership variables. 
On average, the boards of directors seat 9.71 members when these seats are filled by 2.33 
independent directors, which is much less than the US firms. 75 percentile of the firms have about 
33% independent directors on the board and the minimum percent of independent directors is 0%. 
Thus, unlike their western counterparts, the China’s listed firms normally do not have a majority 
of independent directors. In terms of audit committee, 37% publically-traded firms formed their 
audit committees.  
77% of the listed firms are owned by state, which is the main ownership characteristic in China. 
In addition, the average Cr_5 is 0.58, representing that 58% of the shareholdings are held by the 
first largest shareholders.  
 
3.5 Other variables 
We include several control variables in the regression analysis to account for firm-specific 
characteristics that influence firm performance. First, firm size is measured by ln(assets). Prior 
literature has shown that firm size is positively associated with firm performance significantly 
(for example, Cornett et al., 2008). Thus, we use lagged ln(assets) as our proxy for firm size. 
Firm risk is a measure of the firm’s information environment and the risk of its operating 
environment (Core et al., 1999) and thus is a potential determinant of the value of firm 
performance. In our study, firm risk is defined as the standard deviation of the monthly stock 
returns over the previous 12 months. 
Auditors are believed to play an important role in deterring earnings management. Palmrose 
(1988) suggests that the “Big Eight” (now “Big Four”) auditing firms provide higher quality 
audits so that they are less frequently sued. However, in China independent audits are quite new 
and thus audit quality may be more variable in China and help explain the incidence of fraud. It’s 
very difficult to measure audit quality, specifically in China (DeAngelo, 1981). A possible 
method is to deem accounting firms as firms providing high audit quality when they have joint 
ventures with the international Big 4. 
Leverage is also expected to play an important role in executive pay-performance relation in 




rate as control variable, which is measured as the book value of debt to the book value of 
shareholders’ equity. 
Panel D of Table 2 represents the summary statistics of firm-specific characteristics. On average, 
leverage is 1.31, and the average natural log of assets is 21.22. The standard deviation of the 
monthly stock returns is averagely 0.1. However, only 7% listed firms are served by Big 4 
accounting firms in China. 
4. Empirical results 
4.1 Earnings management 
Table 3 shows empirical results of the earnings management proxied by discretionary accruals. 
Discretionary accruals are computed from the modified Jones model, using Eq. 2 above. Column 
1 describes coefficient estimates and standard errors of a pooled time-series cross-sectional 
regression model. Column 2 manifests Fama-MacBeth10 estimates of Eq. 2. We can see from the 
table that the pooled regressions result in higher significance levels than the Fama and MacBeth 
(1973) estimates.  
The point estimates of the coefficients from pooled model and Fama-MacBeth model in Table 3 
are similar. As shown by Table 3, earnings management is significantly increased by CEO 
compensation (β is 0.0072 and 0.0060, respectively), which is consistent with past research as 
well as our expectations. Both coefficients are significant at better than the 10% level.  The 
estimates of coefficients are also economically significant. For example, using a coefficient 
estimate of .0072 for ln(CEO pay), an increase of one sample standard deviation of ln(CEO pay) 
( i.e., in Panel D of Table 2, an increase in ln(CEO pay) of 0.89) would increase the magnitude of 
assets-weighted discretionary accruals by approximately 0.0072*0.89=0.0064, or 0.64 percent.  
Likewise, state-owned firms decrease the earnings management significantly (β=-.0088 and -
.0101 in pooled and Fama-MacBeth models), possibly resulting from the persistent corporate 
 
10 Fama-Macbeth (1973) designed and implemented a basic two-step regressions that is used in most of the 
empirical results and become a standard methodology in the financial literature in terms of its simplicity 
and clarity. The procedure is as follows: In the first step, for each single time period a cross-sectional 
regression is performed. Then, in the second step, the final coefficient estimates are obtained as the average 




governance improvement of the state-owned companies. All other corporate governance variables 
do not show any significant influence on the magnitude of earnings management.  
4.2 Firm performance 
Table 4 and 5 indicates regression results of firm performance on CEO compensation, board 
characteristics and ownership variables. We use reported firm performance (ROA), operating 
income/assets, which can be referred to as unadjusted performance, as the dependent variable in 
Table 4. The pre-managed performance reflects managers’ discretionary accounting treatments. 
Then we employ adjusted performance, which is computed as the difference between operating 
income/assets and %DA, as the dependent variable in Table 5. The adjusted performance is 
expected to exclude management discretions. We also include firm size (log of book value of 
assets), equity structure (leverage), firm risk (standard deviation of the last year monthly stock 
returns), and accounting quality (whether has a Big4 accounting firm) as control variables for 
firm performance in these regressions.  
In Table 4, point estimates of all coefficients are almost identical whether a pooled time-series 
cross sectional or a Fama-MacBeth approach is used. The log of the executive compensation can 
explain the reported performance to a large extent. The coefficient of the variable is positive in 
each regression (0.0104 and 0.0108, respectively) and is significant at better than the 1% level in 
both specifications. This coefficient implies that one sample standard deviation increase in this 
variable starting from its mean value would increase reported ROA by 0.93%. These results 
suggest that higher lagged executive compensation is associated with improved firm performance 
in the next period, consistent with prior research that CEO compensation is an effective incentive 
to managers to improve firm performance. 
However, the coefficient on the proportion of independent directors on board is 0.0153 and 
0.0106 in the two regressions, respectively, and is statistically insignificant for both specifications. 
Thus, an increase of the proportion of independent directors on board does not tend to result in 
improved reported firm performance as we predict. The alternative explanation is that most 
Chinese boards do not have majority of independent directors and hence cannot be as effective as 
their Western counterparts in enhancing reported firm performance. Likewise, the coefficients on 
other two board characteristics are statistically insignificant in those two regressions, either 
pooled regression or Fama-MacBeth regression. 
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In terms of the ownership variables, the coefficient of ownership concentration (CR_5) is 
statistically and economically significant in both regressions (β=0.05 and 0.06, respectively), 
supporting our expectation that higher ownership concentration is likely to mitigate the free-rider 
problem from individual investors and hence improve firm performance.  
Also take a look at the coefficients on the control variables. The coefficient on the firm size is 
both positively significant in two regressions at better than 1% level. In contrast, the point 
estimates of leverage are significantly negative in those two regressions, suggesting that higher 
leverage increases the default risk and hence devalues the firm. The estimates of coefficient on 
firm risk (STDRET) is negatively significant (β=-0.18) at better than 5% level in Fama-MacBeth 
regression whilst insignificant in the pooled regression (β=0.03). The economic impact of firm 
risk is relatively modest, suggesting a higher risk normally associates with worse firm 
performance. The coefficient on Big4 is only significant in Fama-MacBeth regression (β=.01), 
resulting in a 0.26% increase in reported ROA for one sample standard deviation increase in this 
variable starting from its mean value. 
Overall, the results of Table 4 are consistent with our hypotheses of firm performance and 
corporate governance. That is, increased executive compensation as well as ownership 
concentration improves firm performance. However, the expected positive effect of board 
independence is not influential when the firm performance is measured as reported ROA. 
Table 5 represents the regression results by using the same model as Table 4, but the dependent 
variable is measured as the adjusted performance, operating income/assets-%DA. The coefficient 
on ln(CEO pay), which was .0104 in the pre-managed earnings regression (Table 4), decreased 
to .0032 in the pooled regression in Table 5. The estimates of coefficient on ln(CEO pay) are 
significantly positive in the pooled regression in Table 4, but no significant influence is found in 
the pooled regression in Table 5. In stark contrast to the analysis results in Table 4 when firm 
performance is measured as reported ROA, the effect of executive compensation on firm 
performance disappears in Table 5 when firm performance is measured as adjusted ROA. That is, 
the original significant CEO pay-performance relation disappears taking account of adjusted 
performance, and as a result, we can identify the similar results from Cornett et al. (2008) that the 
evident executive pay-performance relation is largely cosmetic. 
On the other hand, the coefficient on the proportion of independent directors on board almost 
doubles from 0.0153 in Table 4 to 0.0294 in Table 5 when the coefficient also changes from 
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insignificant in Table 4 to positively significant at better than 5% level in Table 5. The economic 
impact of the variables increases commensurately like the study of Cornett et al. (2008). 
Interestingly, the coefficient on ownership concentration (CR_5) reduces from 0.05 in Table 4 to 
0.0345 in Table 5, all significant at better than 1% level.  Therefore, the board independent does 
improve true firm performance after excluding earnings management while the impact of 
ownership concentration weakens in response the adjusted firm performance. Our results extend 
the study of Cornett et al. (2008) by showing that only the board independence can improve true 
performance in China when the effects of other governance variables lower if earnings 
management is considered. Specifically, after adjusting for the impact of discretionary accruals, 
adjusted performance shows no relation with executive cash compensation. 
4.3 Robustness tests  
With respect to CG Code 2002, at least one third independent directors on the board are required 
by the end of 2003 for Chinese listed firms. Thus, most listed firms are willing to keep at least 
one third independent directors on their boards from 2003 onwards, resulting in changes, 
specifically improvement, in governance structure in China’s listed firms. These changes have the 
potential to alter the monitoring of the board of directors and hence the firm performance to some 
extant. After the CG code 2002 was introduced, governance structures were expected to enhance 
firm performance in a more effective way. Thus, we evaluate the governance practice of 2003, the 
first year since the 2002 code, and investigate whether the results are robust to our previous 
results. 
We investigate again the same regressions of firm performance on corporate governance variables 
like in Table 4 and Table 5 to see if the new requirement of board independence since CG code 
2002 could have affected our results. In response to the fact that CG code 2002 was introduced in 
2002, we focus on the results for 2003, the first full year after CG code 2002. As it is shown from 
Table 6, the consistency of the regressions in 2003 provides support to our previous empirical 
evidence. Table 6 indicates our additional results for that year. The first column uses operating 
income/assets as the dependent variable when the second column employs adjusted performance, 
(operating income/assets)-%DA as the dependent variable. The results we obtain for this year are 
highly consistent with those for the full sample period (2000-2007). More specifically, the effects 
of governance variables are increasingly evident in 2003, compared with the pre-CG code period 
(2000-2002). For example, CEO compensation is positively significantly associated with pre-
managed performance (β=0.01) while it is insignificantly related with adjusted performance 
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(β=0.003). The coefficient of independent directors on board doubles from 0.0685 for pre-
managed performance to 0.1271 for adjusted performance, significance are both better than 5%. 
However, the estimate of coefficient on ownership concentration (CR_5) increases from 0.08 for 
pre-managed performance to 0.1 for adjusted performance. An alternative explanation is that 
corporate governance reform in 2002 enhanced the protection of minority shareholders as well as 
the incentives for large shareholders, leading to more significant relation between ownership 
concentration and firm performance. Surprisingly, the coefficient on Big4 dummy also increases 
from 0.0251 to 0.0317, both are significant at better than 10% level, also resulting from the 
governance reform. 
In order to examine the sample firms in more details, we use one indicator variable to indicate 
whether the ROA is the highest (in the highest half of ROA) or lowest (in the lowest half of 
ROA), resulting in two sub-samples. The results in Table 7 show a substantial increase in the 
coefficient on board independence in well performing firms while their poor performing 
counterparts do not. Moreover, the results on CEO compensation provide consistent results 
supporting our previous analysis. Of particular interest is the ownership concentration (CR_5), it 
is significantly positively associated with firm performance in well performing firms while the 
relation is not found in poor performing firms. That is, board independence as well as ownership 
concentration are more likely to improve true firm performance in well performing firms. 
At last, started from 2005, non-tradable shares reform aims at changing the status of non-tradable 
shares to tradable shares. These changes are supposed to meliorate the governance structure of 
most Chinese listed firms which characterized with highly concentrated ownership of State. 
Therefore, it is reasonable to expect closer pay-for-performance after the commencement of non-
tradable shares reform. Figure 1 shows the coefficients on CEO cash compensation from the year-
by-year regressions on reported ROA (operating income/assets). There seems to be an increase in 
the impact of executive compensation from 2005. This trend is statistically and economically 
significant, consistent with the non-tradable shares in this period. 
5. Conclusions 
Our analysis suggests that management compensation in Chinese listed firms modestly affects the 
magnitude of earnings management (proxied by discretionary accruals). It also suggests that the 
significant positive influence of CEO compensation on reported firm performance may be mostly 
cosmetic, which is merely the results of management discretion on accounting treatments. In stark 
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contrast, the proportion of independent directors on board increasingly improves firm 
performance if true performance is considered even though most Chinese boards have less than 
50% independent directors. Moreover, unlike board independence, we found that the impact of 
ownership concentration reduces if the adjusted firm performance is computed, as well as other 
governance variables. Overall, the quality of true firm performance improves significantly with 
board monitoring while the strong positive CEO pay-performance relation disappears after 
adjusting firm performance for earnings management. 
In order to investigate China’s data in more detail, more firm observations should be included in 
the study, nonetheless, samples in our analysis are only limited to publically traded firms when 
the fact is that more firms in China with strong earnings manipulation incentives are not yet 
publically traded. Therefore, samples should be extended by including non-publically traded 
firms that have normal earnings management, therefore their data can shed us more light on 
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Table 1. Definitions of variables 
This table provides variable definitions and lag structure used in the empirical analysis 
Variable Definition 
Firm performance  
ROA (lagged one year) The average roa, which is calculated as EBIT divided by the 
book value of assets of the current year  
CEO compensation  
Ln(CEOcom) (lagged one 
year) 
the logarithm of average annual compensation of CEOs and 
paid directors, calculated by dividing the sum of annual 
CEOs and directors’ compensation by the number of CEOs 
and paid directors 
Board characteristics  
boardind (lagged one year) Proportion of independent directors on board 
AC (lagged one year) equal to 1 if audit committee exists under the board of 
directors, 0 otherwise 
Ln(boardsize) (lagged one 
year) 
Natural log of the total number of directors serving on the 
board 
Ownership structure  
State-owned( lagged one 
year) 
equal to 1 if state is the controlling shareholder, 0 otherwise





Ln(Assets) (lagged one 
year) 
Natural log of the book value of assets 
Lev (lagged one year) leverage rate (total debt/total assets) 
Stdret (lagged one year) Standard deviation of stock returns over the year 
Big4 (lagged one year) equal to 1 if financial statements are audited by Big 4 
accounting firms, 0 otherwise 
industry Dummy variables, 21 industries according to Standard 





Table 2. Summary statistics 
Panel A: CEO compensation   
  Year No. Mean S.D. Minimum Maximum 
Ceocom 2000 476 33,200.9 32,733.1 1,600 329,100 
 2001 545 45,631.3 40,031.1 3,046.1 290,286.8 
 2002 857 59,317.9 50,374.0 3,648.3 425,466.9 
 2003 950 74,349.3 71,138.1 5,570.7 1,211,048 
  2004 1021 87,144.2 90,641.8 5,479.2 1,516,119 
  2005 1104 85,652.0 91,707.0 0 1,655,976 
  2006 1156 246,844.8 216,665.2 6,000 3,016,200 
  2007 1086 325,800.5 324,395 0 4,700,000 
Summary of statistics for the sample firms listed on Shanghai and Shenzhen stock 
exchange during the years 2000-2007. Compensation amounts are expressed in 2000-
constant Yuan. 












































Ln(ceocom) 1.0000          
Boardind 0.4094 1.0000         
Ln(boardsiz
e) 
-0.0064 -0.0403 1.0000        
Ln(assets) 0.3716 0.1668 0.1819 1.0000       
LEV 0.1303 0.1641 0.0371 0.2753 1.0000      
Big4 0.1622 0.0223 0.1172 0.2773 -0.0480 1.0000     
stateown -0.0710 -0.1581 0.1221 0.1476 -0.0628 0.0780 1.0000    
AC 0.3094 0.4312 0.0908 0.1242 0.0946 0.0520 -0.0263 1.0000   
stdret -0.0304 0.0340 -0.0373 -0.1029 0.1122 -0.037 -0.0432 0.0184 1.0000  















Panel C: Descriptive statistics on accruals and average performance   









.00027 .00014 .12175 -.04806 .04561 
Abs(%DA) .07154 .04689 .09851 .02082 .08979 
Performance measures      
Reported: 
ROA=operating income/assets 
.02651 .02996 .12856 .00747 .06002 
Unmanaged: 
operating income/assets-%DA 
.02614 .02865 .15666 -.02036 .08301 
Industry-adjusted performance      
Reported: 
ROA=operating income/assets 
-0.00000 .00509 .12547 -.02208 .03502 
Unmanaged: 
operating income/assets-%DA 
-0.00000 .00266 .15379 -.04593 .05566 
Financial statement data are obtained from CCER database for each year, 2000-2007. For 
each firm, we identify industry comparison firms as all firms listed on CCER with the 
same three-digit SIC code of CSRC China. Industry-adjusted performance is the firm’s 
operating income in any year minus the average industry value for that year. We measure 
firm performance alternatively as reported ROA, operating income/Assets, or 
performance adjusted for discretionary accruals, operating income/Assets-%DA. Normal 
discretionary accruals are computed as Eq. 2. %DA (percentage discretionary accruals) 
are residuals between accrual accruals and normal accruals as a fraction of assets defined 
by the modified Jones model. 









Panel D: Descriptive statistics on board characteristics and ownership variables   
Variable Mean Median Standard 
deviation 
25th percentile 75th Percentile 
CEO compensation      
Ln(CEOcom) (lagged 
one year) 
10.83 10.87 .89 10.27 11.44 
Board characteristics      
Boardind (lagged one 
year) 
.24 .33 .15 .09 .33 
AC (lagged one year) .37 0 .48 0 1 
Board size 9.71 9 2.26 9 11 
Ln(boardsize)  
(lagged one year) 
2.24 2.20 .23 2.20 2.40 
Ownership structure      
State-owned( lagged 
one year) 
.77 1 .42 1 1 
Cr_5 (lagged one 
year) 
.58 .59 .14 .49 .68 
Firm-level control 
variables 
     
Natural log of assets 
(lagged one year) 
21.22 21.12 .93 20.59 21.76 
Lev (lagged one year) 1.31 .96 2.78 .54 1.61 
Stdret (lagged one 
year) 
.10 0.10 .04 .08 .12 
Big4 (lagged one 
year) 
.07 0 .26 0 0 







Table 3. Discretionary accruals computed by modified Jones model 













































Adjusted R-squared# 0.007 0.023 
***:P<0.001, **:P<0.01, *: P<0.05, +: P<0.1 
#: In Fama-MacBeth regressions, R-squared is the average R-squared of year-by-year 
regressions. 







Table 4. Determinants of reported performance (ROA) 
The dependent variable is ROA (operating income/assets) for firm j in year t. The sample 
period is 2000-2007. Column 1 regression is estimated as pooled time-series cross 
sectional regression. Column 2 shows Fama-MacBeth regression results, adjusted for 













































No. 7327 7327 
Adjusted R-squared# 0.20 0.15 
***:P<0.001, **:P<0.01, *: P<0.05, +: P<0.1 
#: In Fama-MacBeth regressions, R-squared is the average R-squared of year-by-year 
regressions. 






Table 5. Determinants of unmanaged performance 
The dependent variable is unmanaged performance (operating income/assets-%DA) for 
firm j in year t. The sample period is 2000-2007. Column 1 regression is estimated as 
pooled time-series cross sectional regression. Column 2 shows Fama-MacBeth regression 













































No. 7239 7239 
Adjusted R-squared# 0.10 0.10 
***:P<0.001, **:P<0.01, *: P<0.05, +: P<0.1 
#: In Fama-MacBeth regressions, R-squared is the average R-squared of year-by-year 
regressions. 





Table 6. Determinants of reported performance (ROA) and unmanaged performance, 
2003 
The dependent variable is ROA, operating income/assets, in column 1, and unmanaged 
performance, (operating income/assets-%DA), in column 2, for firm j in 2003. 
















































No. 953 943 
Adjusted R-squared 0.10 0.03 
***:P<0.001, **:P<0.01, *: P<0.05, +: P<0.1 




Table 7. Determinants of reported performance (ROA) and unmanaged performance, 
high and low performance (ROA) subsets (2000-2007) 





































































































No. 3665 3626 3662 3613 
Adjusted R-squared 0.26 0.20 0.05 0.01 
***:P<0.001, **:P<0.01, *: P<0.05, +: P<0.1 




Fig.1. Results of yearly cross-sectional regressions.  
This figure represents the coefficient of average CEO compensation from year-by-year 
estimation of the regression in Table 4. The dependent variable is reported performance, 
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